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Reservoir-induced seismicity is considered to have occurred at four Cali-
fornia sites. The four reservoirs and the largest triggered earthquake as-
sociated with each one are: Lake Mendocino in Mendocino County, M 5.2 
(see CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY. December 1978. p. 275-281): Lake Crowley in 
Mono County. M 6.0 (see CDMG Special Report 150. p. 92-94) : Lake Oroville 
in Butte County. M 5.7 (see CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY. June 1982. p. 115-118) : 
and Lake Shasta in Shasta County. M < 3. 
In numerous parts of the world today, 
including some of the most highly devel-
oped countries, many dam designers and 
operators have tended to close their eyes 
to the engineering problems posed by res-
ervoir-induced earthquakes. One some-
times hears these kinds of defensive 
arguments: ( 1) no convincing correlation 
has yet been demonstrated between earth-
quakes and reservoirs; (2) since the natu-
ral seismicity at a given site is low, the 
danger of reservoir-inducement is there-
fore also low; (3) the geology at a given 
site is different from that at localities 
where major reservoir-induced events 
have occurred; (4) only three or four out 
of some 11 ,000 large dams worldwide 
have experienced significant induced 
earthquakes, and one should therefore not 
worry about a given site; and (5) no dam 
has yet failed disastrously because of a 
reservoir-induced earthquake, and the 
danger is thus grossly exaggerated. While 
many of these arguments have some ele-
ments of truth to them, they are essential-
ly evading the primary issues: Virtually 
every careful study has concluded that 
there is indeed a cause-and-effect relation-
ship between some earthquakes and some 
reservoirs, and two dams (Koyna, India, 
and Hsinfengkiang, China) have in fact 
come uncomfortably close to disastrous 
failure during such events. Furthermore, 
it is precisely in the regions of low natural 
seismicity where the major existing prob-
lems lie, because in areas of high seismici-
ty dams are usually designed for substan-
tial earthquake resistance anyway. 
The unhappy current state of affairs is 
that our degree of understanding of reser-
voir-induced earthquakes is so minimal 
that almost no new reservoir anywhere in 
the world can be declared free of this pos-
sible danger. In particular, we do not 
know why such earthquakes occur, and 
we cannot as yet recognize with confi-
dence those areas where reservoir-in-
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CDMG is currently investigating seismicity at Lake Oroville. The seismici-
ty at this location apparently is influenced or controlled by the seasonal 
variations in reservoir water storage. as indicated in the June 1982 issue of 
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY ... editor. 
duced earthquakes are more likely than at 
other localities. It is easy to say that the 
geology and seismo-tectonics of a given 
site are different from those at Koyna, for 
example, but until we understand what it 
is in the physical environment of Koyna 
that led to the triggering of earthquakes 
there, this is not a very meaningful state-
ment. And one must recognize that the 
various sites where major induced events 
have occurred represent a wide variety of 
geologic environments; there is as yet no 
recognized geologic theme at these locali-
ties which marks them as particularly dis-
tinctive or dangerous as compared to the 
thousands of apparently similar sites 
where large events have not occurred. 
Even nearby reservoirs that seem to be in 
the same geologic environment have 
sometimes given rise to widely disparate 
degrees of activity, as has recently been 
demonstrated at Manic 3 Reservoir, Que-
bec (Leblanc and Anglin, 1978). 
Therefore, in estimating risk, we are to 
a large degree forced to utilize a statistical 
approach based on the total experience 
throughout the world. Out of some 11,000 
worldwide "large" dams, only a small 
number have triggered known seismic ac-
tivity. Packer and others (1977) list 16 
"accepted" and 35 "questionable" cases 
of reservoir-induced seismicity, and Simp-
son (1976) lists 32 cases of "changed" 
seismicity, including some where the fill-
ing of the reservoir caused the natural 
seismicity to decrease. Many other cases 
of changed micro-earthquake activity 
have probably escaped notice or report. 
But of more significance is the number of 
instances of induced earthquakes large 
enough to be potentially damaging, and 
only four induced events have exceeded 
magnitude 5.7. These are: Hsinfengkiang, 
China, 1962, M = 6.1 (Sheng and others, 
1973; Wang and others, 1975); Kariba, 
Rhodesia-Zambia, 1963, M 5.8 
(Gough and Gough, 1970a, 1970b); Kre-
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masta, Greece, 1966, M = 6.3 (Gupta 
and Rastogi, 1976; Drakopoulos, 1974); 
and Koyna, India, M = 6.5 (Gupta and 
Rastogi, 1976; Guha and others, 1971) . 
All of these earthquakes were associated 
with reservoirs with water depths exceed-
ing 80 m, of which there are perhaps 200 
worldwide (Packer and others, 1977, list 
179 reservoirs with water depths exceed-
ing 92 m). Thus, for a deep reservoir one 
might argue that the statistical chances of 
an earthquake exceeding magnitude 5.7 
being triggered are perhaps 4 in 200. Al-
though this probability might appear to be 
very low, assuredly it is not so low that A 
engineers can dismiss the phenomenon of W 
reservoir-induced earthquakes when de-
signing large dams, almost all of which 
have truly catastrophic consequences of 
failure. 
Therefore, 1t 1s the author's opinion 
that at this time, anywhere in the world, 
almost any new dam that will impound 
water to depths exceeding 80-100 m must 
be designed with the assumption that a 
magnitude 6.5 earthquake could occur 
nearby. It should also be emphasized that 
the shaking associated with a local earth-
quake of this magnitude does not normal-
ly represent a terribly severe design 
restriction for either concrete or embank-
ment dams, although the effects of heavy 
shaking on some critical auxiliary struc-
tures such as outlet towers and spillway 
gates may require very special attention. 
One must keep in mind that this some-
what discouraging state of affairs could 
change very rapidly as the result of re-
search currently underway. Particularly 
promising at the moment are studies of 
the subsurface hydrologic environments 
near reservoirs. Although the mechanism 
of reservoir-inducement is not under-
stood, it is probably closely related to A 
pore-pressure changes in underlying fault W 
zones resulting from reservoir filling. And 
although we cannot as yet confidently 
recognize diagnostic geologic features 
associated with areas of reservoir-in-
ducement, there is increasing evidence 
that large triggered events are most 
likely in areas of active (i.e., Holo-
cene) faulting. It is particularly unfortu-
nate that careful geologic field studies 
emphasizing the neotectonic environment 
have not yet been carried out in a number 
of areas where reservoir-induced earth-
quakes have been documented. 
Several investigators (e.g., Simpson, 
1976; Packer and others, 1977) have 
pointed out that induced earthquakes 
during reservoir filling are most numer-
ous in areas of normal and strike-slip 
faulting, as opposed to areas of thrust 
faulting. In at least one case (Tarbela 
Dam, Pakistan), moreover, minor seis-
micity in a thrust-faulted region has been 
observed to decrease during periods of 
reservoir fllling, and a reasonable me-
chanical argument has been made for this 
phenomenon (Jacob and others, 1979). 
Although these kinds of research studies 
have only lintited engineering application 
at the moment, assuredly they represent 
the types of efforts that eventually will 
lead to a full understanding of the reser-
voir-inducement problem and to its engi-
neering mitigation. 
, For the darn designer and operator, 
many significant questions remain in ad-
dition to that of the probability of reser-
voir inducement. Among these are the 
following: 
IS SURFACE FAULTING POSSI-
BLE IN ASSOCIATION WITH A 
RESERVOIR-INDUCED EARTH-
QUAKE? Inasmuch as the largest report-
ed reservoir-induced earthquakes are of 
the same magnitude as those often as-
sociated with surface faulting in natural 
events, there is no obvious reason why 
surface rupture should not accompany 
some triggered events. Indeed, the 1967 
Koyna earthquake appears to have been 
associated with about 30 em of surface 
displacement on a Holocene fault that 
passed through an arm of the reservoir 
(Cluff, 1977) . Of particular concern, of 
course, is the possibility that such a fault 
might pass through the dam itself, as was 
the subject of considerable debate and 
concern in the case of Auburn Dam, Cali-
fornia (Allen, 1978) . 
IS IT POSSIBLE THAT TRIG-
GERED DISPLACEMENT MIGHT 
OCCUR ON A FAULT OTHERWISE 
CONSIDERED TO BE "INACTIVE"? 
Under natural conditions, displacements 
on "inactive" faults are usually not con-
sidered credible from the point of view of 
engineering planning. In fact, this is often 
the basis for the definition of "active" vs. 
"inactive" faults. In the author's opinion, 
however, reservoir loading could conceiv-
ably cause displacement on a fault nor-
mally considered "inactive," in view of 
the fact that the reservoir may produce a 
stress distribution quite unlike that which 
the area has experienced for many thou-
sands of years. This would seem like a 
particularly credible scenario where a 
fault zone was a major and continuous 
zone of weakness (e.g., a throughgoing 
massive shear zone) even though it had 
experienced no displacements within 
Holocene time. Packer and others 
(1977) present an opposing point of view. 
IS MAGNITUDE 6.5 THE MAX-
IMUM EARTHQUAKE THAT CAN 
BE EXPECTED BY RESERVOIR IN-
DUCEMENT? The largest generally ac-
cepted induced event to date is of 
magnitude 6.5 (Koyna, 1967), and there 
is no particular reason to assume that this 
is the largest event that is physically possi-
ble. Nevertheless, in view of the unique-
ness of the Koyna event-and the 
thousands of dams that have not ex-
perienced similar earthquakes-it would 
appear unduly conservative at this time to 
assume that still larger triggered earth-
quakes should be considered in the siting 
and design of most structures. In areas 
close to major active faults, larger design 
earthquakes are often stipulated, of 
course, as representative of possible natu-
rally occurring events. 
HOW LONG FOLLOWING THE 
INITIAL FILLING OF A RESER-
VOIR ARE INDUCED EARTH-
QUAKES LIKELY? The four largest 
reservoir-induced events had time inter-
vals between the commencement of filling 
and the largest earthquakes of 1, 3, 4, and 
5 years. In each of these cases, however, 
minor seismic activity started at the time 
of first filling and continued at ·least 
sporadically until the time of the largest 
shock. Time intervals of larger than 5 
years are certainly not ruled out, although 
admittedly the cause-and-effect relation-
ship becomes less convincing with longer 
elapsed time. One of the reasons why 
many scientists do not consider the 1975 
earthquake near Oroville Dam, Califor-
nia, (M = 5.7) to be reservoir-induced is 
that the time delay was 8 years, and all but 
the last few months of this period was 
devoid of even small shocks in the reser-
voir area. Others have argued that the 
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long delay was in fact closely related to 
the fact that the epicenter was as far as 11 
km from the reservoir, albeit on a .fault 
that extended into the reservoir (Bufe and 
others, 1976). 
WOULD NOT AN EARTHQUAKE 
SIMILAR TO A RESERVOIR-IN-
DUCED EARTHQUAKE OCCUR 
SOONER OR LATER IN THE AREA 
EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE 
RESERVOIR? It is generally agreed that 
a reservoir, by whatever phy~cal mech-
anism, is only triggering the release of 
natural tectonic strain, and is not in itself 
generating the principal seismic energy. 
Therefore one might argue that the pres-
ence of the reservoir has only hastened the 
arrival of an event that would have hap-
pened at a later time anyway. On the 
other hand, one can argue equally well 
that many areas of the earth's crust are 
very close to the breaking point on a 
more-or-less continuing basis, as might be 
envisaged from the concepts of plate tec-
tonics. Only when a perturbing phenome-
non is introduced, such as a large 
reservoir, is the breaking strength locally 
exceeded. The author prefers this second 
point of view and therefore argues that the 
seismic history of a region, even if extend-
ing over many hundreds of years, is not an 
adequate guide to the maximum credible 
size of a reservoir-induced earthquake in 
the region. 
WHAT EFFECT CAN THE PHE-
NOMENON OF RESERVOIR-IN-
DUCED SEISMICITY HAVE ON 
DAM DESIGN? Aside from the obvious 
wisdom of designing a structure to with-
stand the shaking associated with the 
largest credible local earthquake, the type 
of design of a dam may depend on 
whether surface fault displacements 
through the darn are considered credible. 
Dams have been designed with this as-
sumption (Sherard and others, 1974), 
and the proposed designs of other dams 
have been changed when this danger 
became accepted, as at Auburn Darn, Cal-
ifornia. The phenomenon of triggered 
earthquakes may also give added weight 
to the arguments for rapid-drawdown ca-
pability for a dam that is under design. 
WHAT EFFECT CAN THE PHE-
NOMENON OF RESERVOIR-IN-
DUCED EARTHQUAKES HAVE ON 
DAM OPERATION? Simpson and Neg-
matullaev ( 1978) have suggested that res-
ervoir-induced earthquakes might, in a 
sense, be controlled by the manner in 
which a reservoir is filled. They specifi-
cally suggest that such events can be held 
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to a minimum if a reservoir is filled slowly 
and smoothly, based on experience at 
Nurek Dam, USSR. In at least one case 
(Hsinfengkiang Dam, China), the sur-
prising presence of many small earth-
quakes during the initial stages of filling 
led to such concern that the dam was im-
mediately strengthened, the wisdom of 
which became apparent shortly thereafter 
when a magnitude 6.1 event occurred al-
most beneath the structure (Sheng and 
others, 1973) . 
It is generally recommended by seis-
mologists that some sort of seismographic 
network be established around new large, 
deep reservoirs. But many dam owners 
have logically asked why such an invest-
ment is called for; certainly a network 
cannot stop reservoir-induced events from 
happening! Some seismologists have 
seemed to reply that seismographs are jus-
tified simply because their cost is so minis-
cule as compared to total project costs, 
but assuredly a more responsible justifica-
tion is called for. 
There are several valid reasons why a 
seismographic network should be estab-
lished: ( 1) Particularly for low-magni-
. tude earthquakes, only through 
instrumental recording can it be estab-
lished whether or not reservoir-induced 
events are in fact occurring, and all ac-
cepted large triggered events have been 
preceded by numerous small ones. (2) If, 
as argued by Simpson and Negmatullaev 
( 1978), reservoir-induced earthquakes 
can be partly controlled by the manner in 
which the reservoir is filled, a reasonably 
sophisticated network is mandatory to 
plan operations and to monitor progress. 
(3) The public living near and down-
stream from major dams will inevitably be 
concerned about earthquakes in the vicin-
ity, whether or not reservoir-induced, and 
a seismographic network is the only real-
istic means for providing prompt, forth-
right, and accurate information. 
WHAT KINDS OF NETWORKS 
SHOULD DAM OWNERS BE PRE-
PARED TO INSTALL AND OPER-
ATE? A minimum of three stations is 
required for a hypocentral location, and 
the author suggests that for most reser-
voirs, 5 to 8 stations should represent an 
adequate network. Networks with as 
many as 18 stations have sometimes been 
installed, but these have usually been in 
conjunction with sophisticated research 
programs having broader objectives. Ra-
dio or telephone-line telemetry of seismic 
signals to a common recording point is 
now both scientifically advantageous and 
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cost-effective, and in many cases seismic 
telemetry can be combined with telemetry 
that has been planned for other purposes, 
such as hydrologic monitoring. On the 
other hand, relatively simple recording 
and analysis techniques are much to be 
desired, particularly in remote areas, un-
less there is a large research element in-
volved with highly trained personnel. 
Drum recording, even on smoked paper, 
has many operational advantages over so-
phisticated schemes using magnetic tape 
and complex data-analysis techniques. 
In view of the present degree of igno-
rance concerning reservoir-induced earth-
quakes and recognizing the tremendous 
stakes involved, major dam-building 
agencies have a clear obligation to support 
those kinds of research that will enable us 
eventually to solve the problem. The argu-
ment is impelling: Literally millions if not 
billions of dollars are now being expended 
in designing and building dams for reser-
voir-induced earthquakes that will never 
occur, simply because we are as yet unable 
to recognize those areas where such 
events are more likely than others. Own-
ers and builders of individual dams per-
haps cannot be expected to support basic 
research studies of this type from project 
funds, but certainly the major dam-build-
ing agencies should. At least in the United 
States, this obligation seems not tp have 
been generally accepted. From a purely 
economic point of view, not to speak of 
public safety, the problem of reservoir-
induced earthquakes deserves far more at-
tention than it currently is receiving in 
most parts of the world. 
The author appreciates the critical 
comments of T.H. Heaton and G.W. 
Housner. 
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